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Abstract. Is it possible to extract malicious IP addresses reported in
security forums in an automatic way? This is the question at the heart
of our work. We focus on security forums, where security professionals
and hackers share knowledge and information, and often report misbe-
having IP addresses. So far, there have only been a few efforts to extract
information from such security forums. We propose RIPEx, a system-
atic approach to identify and label IP addresses in security forums by
utilizing a cross-forum learning method. In more detail, the challenge is
twofold: (a) identifying IP addresses from other numerical entities, such
as software version numbers, and (b) classifying the IP address as benign
or malicious. We propose an integrated solution that tackles both these
problems. A novelty of our approach is that it does not require training
data for each new forum. Our approach does knowledge transfer across
forums: we use a classifier from our source forums to identify seed in-
formation for training a classifier on the target forum. We evaluate our
method using data collected from five security forums with a total of
31K users and 542K posts. First, RIPEx can distinguish IP address from
other numeric expressions with 95% precision and above 93% recall on
average. Second, RIPEx identifies malicious IP addresses with an average
precision of 88% and over 78% recall, using our cross-forum learning. Our
work is a first step towards harnessing the wealth of useful information
that can be found in security forums.
Keywords: Security, Online communities mining
1 Introduction
The overarching goal of this work is to harness the user generated content in
forums, especially security forums. More specifically, we focus here on collecting
malicious IP addresses, which are often reported at such forums. We use the
term security forums to refer to discussion forums with a focus on security, sys-
tem administration, and in general systems-related discussions. In these forums,
security professionals, hobbyists, and hackers identify issues, discuss solutions,
and in general exchange information.
We provide a few examples of the types of discussions that take place in these
forums that could involve IP addresses, which is our focus. Posts could talk about
a benign IP address, say in configuration files, as in the post: "[T]his thing in
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Fig. 1: The overview of key modules of our approach (RIPEx): (a) collecting data,
(b) IP Identification, and (c) IP Characterization. In both classification stages, we use
our Cross-Seeding approach that in order to generate seed information for training a
classifier for a new forum.
my hosts file: 64.91.255.87 ... [is] it correct?". At the same time, posts could
also report compromised or malicious IP addresses, as in the post: "My browser
homepage has been hijacked to http://69.50.191.51/2484/". Our goal is to auto-
matically distinguish between the two and provide a new source of information
for malicious IP addresses directly from the affected individuals.
The problem that we address here is to find all the IP addresses that are
being reported as malicious in a forum. In other words, the input is all the posts
in a forum and the expected output is a list of malicious IP addresses. As with
any classification problem, one would like to achieve both high precision and
recall. Precision represents the percentage of the correctly labeled over all ad-
dresses labeled malicious. Recall is the percentage of malicious addresses that we
find among all malicious addresses reported in forums. It turns out that this is a
two-step problem. First, we need to solve the IP Identification problem: distin-
guishing IP addresses from other numerical entities, such as a software version.
Second, we need to solve the IP Characterization problem: characterizing IP
address as malicious or benign. The extent of the Identification problem caught
us by surprise: we find 1820 non-address dot-decimals, as we show in table 1.
There is limited work on extracting information from security forums, and
even less work on extracting malicious IP addresses. We can group prior work
in the following categories. First, recent works study the number of malicious IP
addresses in forums, but without providing the comprehensive and systematic
solution that we propose here [7]. Second, there are recent efforts that extract
other types of information from security forums, related to the black market
of hacking services and tools [15], or the behavior and roles of their users [9,1].
Third, other works focus on analyzing structured sources, such as security reports
and vulnerability databases [2,11]. We discuss related work in section 5.
There is a wealth of information that can be extracted from security forums,
which motivates this research direction. Earlier work suggests that there is close
to four times more malicious IP addresses in forums compared to established
databases of such IP addresses [8]. At the same time, there are tens of thousands
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of IP addresses in the forums, as we will see later. Interestingly, not all of the
reported IP addresses are malicious, which makes the classification necessary.
We propose RIPEx1, a comprehensive, automated solution that can detect
malicious IP addresses reported in security forums. As its key novelty, our ap-
proach minimizes the need for human intervention. First, once initialized with
a small number of security forums, it does not require additional training data
to mine new forums. Second, it addresses both the Identification and Charac-
terization problems. Third, our approach is systematic and readily deployable.
We are not aware of prior work claiming these three properties, as we discuss in
section 5. The overview of our approach is shown in figure 1.
The key technical novelty is that we propose Cross-Seeding, a method to
conduct a multi-step knowledge transfer across forums. We use this approach for
both classification problems, when we have no training data for a new forum.
With Cross-Seeding, we create training data for the new forum in the process
depicted in figure 1. We use a classifier based on the current forums to identify
seed information in the new forum. We then use this seed information to train a
classifier for the new forum. This forum-specific classifier performs much better
than if we have used the classifier of the current forums on the new forum. We
refer to this latter knowledge transfer approach as Basic.
We evaluate our approach using five security forums with a total of 31K
users and 542K posts spanning a period of roughly six years. Our results can be
summarized into the following points.
a. Identification: 98% precision with training data per forum. We
develop a supervised learning algorithm for solving the Identification problem in
the case where we have training data for the target forum. Our approach exhibits
98% precision and 96% recall on average across all our sites.
b. Identification: 95% precision with Cross-Seeding. We show that
our Cross-Seeding approach is effective in transferring the knowledge between
forums. Using the WildersSecurity forum as source, we observe an average of
95% precision and 93% recall in the other forums.
c. Characterization: 93% precision with training data per forum.
We develop a supervised learning algorithm for solving the Characterization
problem assuming we have training data for the target forum. Our classifier
achieves 93% precision and 92% recall on average across our forums.
d. Characterization: 88% precision on average with Cross-Seeding
data. We show that our Cross-Seeding approach by using OffensiveCommunity
forum as source can provide 88% precision and 82% recall on average.
e. Cross-Seeding outperforms Basic. We show that Cross-Seeding is
important, as it increases the precision by 28% and recall by 16% on average
in the Characterization problem, and the precision by 8% and recall by 7% on
average in the Identification problem.
f. Using more source forums improves the Cross-Seeding perfor-
mance. We show that, by adding a second source forum, we can improve the
precision by 13% on average over the remaining three forums.
1 In the spirit of double-blind reviewing, we withhold the explanation of the acronym.
3
WildersSec. OffensiveComm. HackThisSite EthicalHackers Darkode
Posts 302710 25538 84125 54176 75491
Threads 28661 3542 8504 8745 7563
Users 14836 5549 5904 2970 2400
Dot-decimal 4325 7850 1486 1591 1097
IP found 3891 6734 1231 1330 1082
Table 1: The basic statistics of our forums
Our work suggests that there is a wealth of information that we find in
security forums and offers a systematic approach to do so.
2 Our Forums and Datasets
We have collected data from five different forums, which cover a wide spectrum
of interests and intended audiences. We present basic statistics of our forums in
Table 1 and we highlight the differences of their respective communities.
Our semi-automated crawling tool. We have developed an efficient and
customizable python-based crawler, which can be used to crawl online forums,
and it could be of independent interest. To crawl a new forum, our tool requires
a configuration file that describes the structure of the forum. Leveraging our
current configuration files, the task of crawling a new forum is simplified signif-
icantly. Due to space limitations, we do not provide further details. Following
are the descriptions of collected forums.
• WildersSecurity (WS) seems to attract system administrator types and
focuses on defensive security: how one can manage and protect one’s system.
Its topics include anti-virus software, best practices, and new vulnerabilities
and its users seem professional and eloquent.
• OffensiveCommunity (OC) seems to be on the fringes of legality. As the
name suggests, the forum focuses on breaking into systems: it provides step
by step instructions, and advertises hacking tools and services.
• HackThisSite (HT) seems to be in between these extremes represented
by the first two forums. For example, there discussions and competitions on
hacking challenges, but it does not act as openly as a black market of illegal
services and tools compared to OffensiveCommunity.
• EthicalHackers (EH) seems to consist mostly of “white hat" hackers, as
its name suggests. The users discuss hacking techniques, but they seem to
have a strict moral code.
• Darkode (DK) is a forum on the dark web that has been taken down by
the FBI in July 2015. The site was a black market for malicious tools and
services similar to OffensiveCommunity.
Our goal is to identify and report IP addresses that the forum readers report
as malicious. We currently do not assess whether the author of the post is right,
though the partial overlap with blacklisted IPs indicates so. We leave for future
work to detect misguided reports of IP addresses.
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Determining the ground-truth. For both of the problems we address
here, there are no well-established benchmarks and labeled datasets. To train and
validate our approach, we had to rely on external databases and some manual
labelling. For the Identification problem, we could not find any external sources
of information and benchmarks. To establish our ground-truth, we selected dot-
decimal expressions uniformly randomly, and we used four different individuals
for the labelling. To ensure testing fairness, we opted for balanced datasets,
which led us to a corpus of 3200 labeled entries across all our forums.
For the Characterization problem, we make use of the VirusTotal site which
maintains a database of malicious IP addresses by aggregating information from
many other such databases. We also provide a second level of validation via
manual inspection.
We create the ground truth by uniformly randomly selecting and assessing
IP addresses from our forums. If VirusTotal and the manual inspection give it
the same label, we add the addresses into our ground-truth. Finally, we again
ensure that we create balanced sets for training and testing to ensure proper
training and testing.
3 Overview of RIPEx
We represent the key components of our approach in addressing the Identification
and Characterization problems. To avoid repetitions, we present at the end the
Cross-Seeding approach, which we use in our solution to both problems.
3.1 The IP Identification module
We describe our proposed method to identify IP addresses in the forum.
The IP address format. The vast majority of IP addresses in the forums
follow the IPv4 dot-decimal format, which consists of 4 decimal numbers in
the range [0-255] separated by dots. We can formally represent the dot-decimal
notation as follows: IPv4 [x1.x2.x3.x4] with xi ∈ [0− 225], for i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Note
that the newer IPv6 addresses consists of eight groups of four hexadecimal digits,
and our algorithms could easily extend to this format as well. Interestingly, we
found a negligible number of IPv6 addresses, and we opted to not focus on
IPv6 addresses here. For example, in WildersSecurity forum, we find 3891 IPv4
addresses and only 56 IPv6 addresses. At such small numbers, it is difficult to
train and test a classifier. Thus, for the rest of this paper, IP address refers to
IPv4 addresses.
The challenge: the dot-decimal format is not enough. If IP addresses
were the only numerical expressions in the forums with this format, the Iden-
tification problem could have been easily solved with straightforward text pro-
cessing and Named-Entity Recognition (NER) tools, such as the Stanford NER
models [6]. However, there is a non-trivial number of other numerical expressions,
which can be misclassified as addresses. For example, we quote a real post: "fac-
tory reset brings me to the Clockworkmod 2.25.100.15 recovery menu". where
the structure 2.25.100.15 refers to the version of Android app "Clockworkmod".
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To this end, we propose a method to solve the IP Identification problem, a
supervised learning algorithm. We first identify the features of interest as we
discuss below. We then train a classifier using the Logistic Regression method
gives the best results among the several methods using 10-fold cross validation
on our ground-truth as we decribed in the previous section.
Feature selection. We use three sets of features in our classification.
a. Contextual information: TextInfo. Inspired by how a human would
determine the answer, we focus on the words surrounding the dot-decimal struc-
ture. For example, the words "server" or "address" suggests that the dot-decimal
is an address, while the words "version" or a software name, like "Firefox" sug-
gests the opposite. At the same time, we wanted to focus on words close to the
dot-decimal structure. Therefore, we introduceWord-Range,W , to determine
the number of surrounding words before and after the dot-decimal structure that
we want to consider in our classification. We use TF-IDF [16] to normalize the
frequency of a word to better estimate its discriminatory value.
b. The numerical values of the dot-decimal: DecimalVal . We use the
numerical value of the four numbers in the the dot-decimal structure as features.
The rationale is that non-addresses, such as software versions, tend to have lower
numerical values. This insight was based on our close interaction with the data.
c. The combined set: Mixed . We combine the two feature sets to create
in order to leverage their discriminating power.
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Fig. 3: Classification accuracy for different
features sets in 10-fold cross validation in
four forums.
Determining the right number of context words, Word-Range. We
wanted to identify the best value of parameter Word-Range for our classification.
In figure 2, we plot the classification accuracy, precision and recall, as we vary
Word-Range, W = 1, 2, 5 and 10, for the WildersSecurity forum and using only
the TextInfo. We see that using one to two words gives better results compared
to using five and ten words. The explanation to this counter-intuitive result is
that considering more words includes text that is not relevant for inferring the
nature of a dot-decimal, which we verified manually.
Using numerical values DecimalVal improves the performance sig-
nificantly. In Figure 3, we plot the classification accuracy of different features
sets. Recall that we are not able to include Darkode forum due to its limited
number of non-IP dot-decimal expressions, as we saw in 3.1. We see that us-
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Fig. 4: Characterization: The effect of the features set on the classification accuracy
with balanced testing data.
ing DecimalVal features alone, we can get 94% overall accuracy and using both
DecimalVal and TextInfo, we get 98% overall accuracy across our forums. Fo-
cusing on the IP address class, we see a an average precision of 95% using only
DecimalVal and, 98% using both DecimalVal and TextInfo.
3.2 The IP Characterization module
We develop a supervised learning algorithm to characterize IP addresses. Here,
we assume that we have labeled data, and we discuss how we handle the absence
of ground truth in section 3.3. We first identify the appropriate set of features
which we discuss below. We then train a classifier and find that the Logistic Re-
gression method gives the best results among several methods that we evaluated.
Due to space limitations, we show a subset of our results.
Features sets for the Characterization problem.We consider and eval-
uate three sets of features in our classification.
a. Text information of the post: PostText . We use the words and their
frequency of appearance in the post. Here, we use the TF-IDF technique [16]
again to better estimate the discriminatory value of a word by considering its
overall frequency. In the future, we intend to experiment with sophisticated
Natural Language Processing models for analyzing the intent of a post.
b. The Contextual Information set: ContextInfo. We consider an ex-
tended feature set that includes both the PostText features, but also features
of the author of the post. These features capture the behaviour of the author,
including frequency of posting, average post length etc. These features were in-
troduced by earlier work [8], with the rationale that profiling the author of a post
can help us infer their intention and role and thus, improve the classification.
Characterization: 93% precision with training data. We assess the
performance of the Characterization classifier using the set of features above
and by using the labeled data of each forum. We evaluate the performance using
10-fold cross validation. In figure 4, we show the accuracy of classification.
We can achieve 93% precision and 92% recall on average across all the forums.
The results are shown in figure 4, where we report the results using the accuracy
across both classes, given that we have balanced training datasets.
Selecting the PostText feature set. We see that, by using PostText fea-
tures on their own, we obtain slightly better results. PostText feature achieves
94% accuracy on average, while using the ContextInfo results in 92% accuracy
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on average across all forums. Furthermore, text-based only features have one
more key advantage: they can transfer between domains in a straightforward
way. Therefore, we use the PostText features in the rest of the paper.
3.3 Transfer Learning with Cross-Seeding
In both classification problems, we face the following conundrum:
a. the classification efficiency is better when the classifier is trained with
forum-specific ground-truth, but,
b. requiring ground-truth for a new forum will introduce manual intervention,
which will limit the practical value of the approach.
We propose to do cross-forum learning by leveraging transfer learning ap-
proaches [5,14]. We use the terms source and target domain to indicate the two
forums with the target forum not having ground-truth available. For both clas-
sification problems, we consider two solutions for classifying the target forum:
a. Basic: We use the classifier from the source forum on the target forum.
b. Cross-Seeding:We propose an algorithm that will help us develop a new
classifier for the target forum by using the old classifier to create training data
as we explain below.
Algorithm 1: Cross-Seeding: transfer learning between forums
1 CrossForum (X ,Y) :
2 Take the union of the features in forum X and Y
3 Apply classifier from X on Y
4 Select the high-confidence instances to create seed for Y
5 Train a new classifier on Y based on the new seeds.
6 Apply the new classifier on Y
Our Cross-Seeding approach. We propose to create training data for the
target forum following the four steps below, which are illustrated in figure 1 and
outlined in algorithm 1.
a. Domain adaptation. The main role of this step is to ensure that the
source classifier can be applied to the target forum. The main issue in our case is
that the feature sets can vary among forums. Recall that, for both classification
problems, we use the frequency of words and these words can vary among forums.
We adopt an established approach that works well for text classification [5]: we
take the union of the feature sets of the source and target forums. The approach
seems to work sufficiently well in our case, as we see later.
b. Creating seed information for the target forum. Having resolved
any potential feature disparities, we can now apply the classifier from the source
forum to the target forum. We create the seeding data by selecting instances of
the target domain, for which the classification confidence is high. Most classifi-
cation methods provide a measure of confidence for each classified instance and
we revisit this issue in section 4.
c. Training a new classifier for the target forum. Having the seed
information, this is now a straightforward step of training a classifier.
8
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Fig. 5: Identification: Cross-Seeding improves both Precision and Recall. Using Wilder-
sSecurity to classify OffensiveCommunity, HackThisSite, and EthicalHackers.
d. Applying the new classifier on the target forum. In this final step,
we apply our newly-trained forum-specific classifier on the target forum.
4 Evaluation of our Approach
We evaluate our approach focusing on the performance of Cross-Seeding for both
the Identification and the Characterization problems.
Our classifier.We use Logistic Regression as our classification engine, which
performed better than several others, including SVM, Bayesian networks, and
K-nearest-neighbors. In Cross-Seeding, we use the Logistic Regression’s predic-
tion probability with a threshold of 0.85 to strike a balance between sufficient
confidence level and adequate number of instances above that threshold. We
found this value to provide better performance than 0.8 and 0.9, which we also
considered.
A. The IP Identification problem. As we saw in section 3.1, our classifi-
cation approach exhibits 98% precision and 96% recall on average across all our
sites, when we train with ground-truth for each forum.
a. Identification: 95% precision with Cross-Seeding. We show that
our cross-training approach is effective in transferring the knowledge between
domains. We use the classifier from WildersSecurity and we use it to classify
three of the other forums, namely, OffensiveCommunity, EthicalHackers, and
HackThisSite. Note that we do not include Darkode in this part of the evaluation
as it did not have sufficient data for testing (less than 15 non-address expressions
in all its posts).
In figure 5, we show the results for precision and recall of cross-training using
Basic and Cross-Seeding. We see that Cross-Seeding improves both precision and
recall significantly. For example, for HackThisSite, Cross-Seeding increases the
precision from 57% to 79% and the recall from 60% to 78%.
b. Identification: Cross-Seeding outperforms Basic. Cross-Seeding im-
proves the precision by 8% and recall by 7% on average for the experiment shown
in figure 5. The average precision increased from 88% to 95% and the average
recall increased from 85% to 97%.
B. The IP Characterization problem. We evaluate our approach for
solving the Characterization problem without per-forum training data. As we
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saw in section 3.2, we can achieve 93% precision and 92% recall on average
across all the forums, when we train with ground-truth for each forum.
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Fig. 6: Characterization: Cross-Seeding improves both Precision and Recall. Using Of-
fensiveCommunity as source, we classify WildersSecurity, HackThisSite, EthicalHackers
and Darkode.
a. Characterization: 88% precision on average with Cross-Seeding.
Using OffensiveCommunity as source, and we classify WildersSecurity, Hack-
ThisSite, EthicalHackers and Darkode as shown in figure 6. Our Cross-Seeding
approach can provide 88% precision and 82% recall on average.
b. Characterization: Cross-Seeding outperforms Basic.We show that
Cross-Seeding improves the classification compared to just reusing the classifier
from another forum. In figure 6, we show the precision and recall of the two ap-
proaches. Using OffensiveCommunity as our source, we see that Cross-Seeding
improves the precision by 28% and recall by 16% on average across the forums
compare to the Basic approach. We also observe that the improvement is sub-
stantial: Cross-Seeding improves both precision and recall in all cases.
OffensiveComm. HackThisSite Darkode Average
Precision 3.3 20.5 17.8 13.2
Recall 8.3 6.4 38.8 17.8
Table 2: Characterization: Using two instead of one source forums improves precision
and recall on average: Average improvement of using EthicalHackers and WildersSecu-
rity as sources together compared to each of them individually.
c. Using more source forums improves the Cross-Seeding perfor-
mance significantly. We quantify the effect of having more than one source
forums in the classification accuracy of a new forum. We use EthicalHackers
and WildersSecurity as our training forums, and we use Cross-Seeding for Of-
fensiveCommunity, HackThisSite, and Darkode. First, we use the source forums
one at a time and then both of them together. In table 2, we show the average
improvement of having two source forums over having one for each target web-
site. Using two source forums increases the classification precision by 13% and
the recall by 17% on average.
Discussion: Source forums and training. How would we handle a new
forum? Given the above observations, we would currently use all our five forums
as sources for a new forum. Overall, we can argue that the more forums we have,
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the more we can improve our accuracy. However, we would like to point out
that some forums are more “similar" and thus more suitable for cross-training.
We will investigate how to best leverage a large group of source forums once we
collect 20-25 more forums.
5 Related Work
We summarize related work clustered into areas of relevance.
a. Extracting IP addresses from security forums. There two main
efforts that focus on IP addresses and security forums [7,8] and neither provides
the comprehensive solution that we propose here. The most relevant work [8]
does not address the Identification problem, and sidesteps the problem of cross-
forum training by assuming training data for each forum. The earlier work [7]
focuses on the spatiotemporal properties of Canadian IP addresses in forums,
but assumes that all identified addresses are suspicious and therefore they did
not employ a classification method, which is the focus of our work.
b. Extracting other information from security forums. Various efforts
have attempted to extract other types of information from security forums. A
few recent studies identify malicious services and products in security forums by
focusing on their availability and price [15,13].
c. Studying the users and posts in security forums.Other efforts study
the users of security forums, group them into different classes, and identify their
roles and social interactions [1,20,9,17,18].
d. Analyzing structured security-related sources. There are several
studies that automate the extraction of information from structured security
documents, extracting ontology and comparing the reported information, such
as databases of vulnerabilities, and security reports from the industry [12,2,10].
Transfer learning methods and applications. There is extensive litera-
ture on transfer learning [5,4,3] and several good surveys [14,19], which inspired
our approach. However, to the best of our knowledge, we have not found any
work that address the same domain-specific challenges or uses all the steps of
our approach, which we described in 3.3.
6 Conclusion
We propose a comprehensive solution for mining malicious IP addresses from
security forums. A novelty of our approach is it minimizes the need for human
intervention. First, once it is initialized with a small number of security forums,
it does not require additional training data for each new forum. To achieve this,
we use Cross-Seeding, which uses initialization via domain adaptation: we use
a classifier from current forums to create seed information for the new forum.
Second, it addresses both the Identification and Characterization problems, un-
like all prior work that we are aware of. We evaluate our method real data and
we show that: (a) our Cross-Seeding approach works fairly well reaching preci-
sion above 85% on average for both classification problems, (b) Cross-Seeding
outperforms the Basic approach, and (c) using more source forums increases the
performance as one would expect.
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Our future plans include: (a) collecting a large number of security forums, (b)
exploring the limits of the classification accuracy by using more source forums,
and (c) exploring additional transfer learning methods.
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